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Three experiments investigated the relationship between the presumption of harm in harm-
free violations of creatural norms (taboos) and the moral emotions of anger and disgust.  
Experiment 1 showed that participants made a presumption of harm to others from taboo 
violations even in conditions described as harmless and not involving other people; this 
presumption was predicted by anger and not disgust. Experiment 2 manipulated taboo 
violation and included a cognitive load task to clarify the post-hoc nature of presumption of 
harm. Experiment 3 was similar but more accurately measured presumed harm.  In 
Experiments 2 and 3, only without load was symbolic harm presumed, indicating its post-hoc 
function to justify moral anger, which was not affected by load.  In general, manipulations of 
harmfulness to others predicted moral anger better than moral disgust, while manipulations of 
taboo predicted disgust better.  The presumption of harm was found on measures of symbolic 
rather than actual harm when a choice existed.   These studies clarify our understanding of the 
relationship between emotions and their justification when people consider victimless, 
offensive acts. 
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Judgments of Taboo-Breaking Behaviors: The Roles of Anger, Disgust, and Presumption of 
Harm 
In Western society today, a common liberal standard of tolerable behavior is rights-
based: people can do as they please, as long as they do not violate other people’s rights (e.g., 
of consent) by doing so. But in 2003, this standard was put to a severe test by the German 
court case of Armin Meiwes, a cannibal who apparently only sought out willing victims. 
Meiwes had found one such individual through the Internet, Bernd Brandes, who after 
videotaping his consent to the act, was dismembered, cooked and partially eaten by Meiwes. 
The initial lesser sentence of manslaughter eventually imposed by the court reflected the 
finding that the act was consensual. According to the judge in the case, "[t]here was an 
agreement between them. This was the killing of a person without murder" (Harding, 2004). 
Many commentators, however, found it paradoxical that such an act should still appear to 
meet the rights- and consent-based standards of liberal morality. One piece was subtitled "If 
everything is permissible between consenting adults, why not?" and went on to comment that 
"(t)he case is a reductio ad absurdum of the philosophy according to which individual desire 
is the only thing that counts in deciding what is permissible in society" (Dalrymple, 2004). 
Although the Meiwes case may be bizarre, it nonetheless touches on a basic ambivalence that 
troubles advocates of a purely rights-based morality: that this moral code might condone 
behavior that one personally finds extremely repugnant. 
Beyond this extreme example, Western society shows a general tendency to 
disapprove of actions that violate taboos about sexuality or other uses of the body, even in 
cases when the action is consensual, private and has no negative consequences for other 
people. For example, in April 2003, the then-US Senator Rick Santorum commented on the 
Supreme Court’s deliberations that would eventually strike down the Texas law against 
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sodomy: “If the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual sex within your 
home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right 
to incest, you have the right to adultery” (Cooperman, 2003). This line of argument draws a 
parallel between the debatably immoral behavior of consensual homosexual relations, and 
taboo actions toward which there exists a greater consensus of disapproval, including incest 
and (later on in the same interview) bestiality.  
We will use the term “taboo” in reference to norms whose violation can be expected to 
provoke inflexible, disgust-related responses, and in particular norms related to the use of the 
body, food and sexuality. This follows from research identifying such norm violation as a key 
elicitor of disgust (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994).  Research also provides numerous 
examples that such responses are fairly inflexible, at least in the short term; for example, a 
sweater worn by someone who had died of cancer is repugnant, even to educated people who 
know that cancer is not contagious (Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986); prejudice against a 
person with a disability—even one sustained from an injury—is intensified by concerns about 
contagious disease (Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003); and a bonbon shaped like dog feces is 
disgusting, though its only fault is an unfortunate resemblance (Haidt et al., 1994).   
Research based on moral judgments has coined the term “moral dumbfounding” 
(Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993), which describes the reactions of many participants when being 
interviewed about harm-free scenarios that violate a strongly held taboo norm, such as 
consensual, private, one-time brother and sister incest using contraception (Haidt, Björklund 
& Murphy, 2000; Haidt & Hersh, 2001). In contrast to a non-taboo-violating situation such as 
the classic Heinz dilemma (Kohlberg, 1981), interviewees immediately expressed disapproval 
of the act, but were less fluent in justifying their disapproval with reasons. These participants 
sometimes gave reasons why the action might be harmful, but these contradicted the details of 
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the story: for example, mentioning that the incest might lead to deformed offspring even 
though two methods of contraception were described, or that their family might be offended 
even though the incest was described as completely secret. These reasons tended to be 
retracted after the interviewer pointed out their implausibility, but participants nonetheless 
condemned the action. The moral dumbfounding effect, then, suggests some degree of 
ambivalence between condoning an action because it is consensual and private, but 
condemning it because it violates taboo norms. This ambivalence occurs even when the action 
is described as completely harmless. 
One way of resolving the ambivalence aroused by the moral dumbfounding effect, as 
these studies show, is to infer or presume some degree of harm to other people, even in cases 
when no harm is present. The presumption of harm makes the condemnation of harmless 
actions easier by insisting that, in some way, harm to other people occurs in such an action. 
For example, research on moral judgments has shown that violations of sexual norms (e.g., 
homosexuality) are perceived by some participants as harmful to other people, even when 
they are described as private and consensual (Haidt & Hersh, 2001). In those studies, the 
presumption of harm shared most of its variance with emotional reactions to the act. 
However, the studies did not attempt to establish which reaction came first, nor did they 
investigate the role of specific moral emotions of condemnation such as anger and disgust.   
Anger and Disgust as Moral Emotions 
Anger and disgust have been investigated chiefly as separate emotions, experienced in 
situations that directly impact the individual feeling them (Berkowitz, 1999;  Roseman & 
Smith, 2001; Scherer, 1999). But they have also been studied as moral emotions that can 
respond to violations of norms endorsed by a group or society (e.g., Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek, 2007). Together with contempt, they are considered part of the “other-condemning” 
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family of emotions (Haidt, 2003), that are used to express different types of disapproval for 
the actions of other people.  
One idea specific to moral emotions, the CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, 
Imada, & Haidt, 1999), argues that moral anger, as opposed to disgust or contempt, is elicited 
specifically by the perception of harm to others, including symbolic harm such as violation of 
rights. The CAD triad hypothesis draws a correspondence between the emotions of contempt, 
anger and disgust, and three types of moral violation with the same initials: community, 
autonomy and divinity (Shweder, Munch, Mahaptra & Park, 1997).  In this research, 
participants gave their reactions to acts that violated "ethics of divinity" (violations of the 
concept of purity, eating behavior, and the sanctity of the body, similar to the taboo norms 
described above), "ethics of autonomy" (violations of the rights of others, including harmful 
acts), or "ethics of community" (public violations of group norms). Results showed that 
divinity violations principally evoked disgust, autonomy violations evoked anger, and 
community violations evoked contempt. These results were similar when participants used 
emotion words and when they endorsed facial expressions of these emotions.  
One limitation of these studies, however, is that they manipulated different moral 
norms holistically by using various scenarios that were later rated to primarily evoke those 
norms. The exact question of what features of those autonomy ethics violations evoked anger, 
and what features of divinity ethics violations evoked disgust, remained unclear. This 
question is especially relevant to scenarios creating a presumption of harm, because such a 
presumption implies that the act is seen to violate autonomy ethics even though it is only 
described as violating divinity ethics. If the presumption of harm to others is made towards a 
violation of divinity ethics, then, would anger accompany it? The data reported in Rozin et al. 
(1999) cannot tell us this; they reported only the most frequent category of emotion for each 
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scenario, and did not measure the extent to which harm to others was inferred by the same 
participants who rated anger and disgust. 
The first aim of our present research, then, is to carry out a more rigorous test of the 
CAD hypothesis, manipulating the presence or absence of harm to others in comparable 
scenarios, and measuring the degree of anger and disgust separately. The manipulation of 
harm to others should affect anger to a greater degree than disgust when the two are measured 
simultaneously. Similarly, a manipulation of the presence or absence of taboo violations 
involving the body should affect disgust to a greater degree than anger.  These findings would 
more definitively establish that moral anger, in particular, responds to harm to others.  This is 
a more specific prediction than given by the preponderance of appraisal models which, in 
describing anger more generally, most consistently implicate other-agency and a negative 
outcome (e.g., Weiner, 1986; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988).   
The simultaneous measurement of anger and disgust also responds to the concerns 
raised by Nabi (2002), who found that when participants were asked to described a situation 
that made them feel “disgusted,” they often describe episodes more akin to anger. These 
results, and those of Russell and Fehr (1994) in which participants gave “disgusted” as a 
synonym for anger, show the need to examine the separate contributions of these emotion 
terms statistically, and ultimately to use non-language-based means of measuring them. Other 
studies providing support for the concept of non-creatural moral disgust have likewise 
depended only on the word “disgust” and its close synonyms (Marzillier & Davey, 2004), 
rather than on facial expressions and words as Rozin and colleagues did (1999). It is thus 
important to study disgust separately from anger through a variety of methods. 
The Nature of the Presumption of Harm 
The second concern in this research deals with how, when and why the presumption of 
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harm is made. As previously mentioned, Haidt and Hersh (2001) showed that some of their 
participants reacted to descriptions of unconventional sexual practices with a presumption of 
harm. Moreover, these results showed that moral judgment was not predicted by harm-based 
reasons independently of affective reactions. They concluded that arguments about harm were 
a post-hoc attempt to justify initial emotion-based negative moral judgments.  However, their 
results do not prove that the presumption of harm was post hoc, because they are also 
consistent with a model in which affective reactions fully mediate between an a-priori 
judgment of harm and a moral disapproval outcome (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). It is 
therefore desirable to demonstrate more conclusively that arguments about harm to others, in 
a case where none is described, represent a post-hoc justification of affect – and specifically, 
due to the correspondence between anger and harm, a justification of anger and not disgust. 
Research on anger has focused mainly on investigating the emotion as a personal 
reaction towards specific stimuli affecting the individual, as opposed to the research on moral 
anger described earlier. Previous research on personal anger has revealed that—in a very 
simple manner—it is a reaction associated to a negative event that can be attributed to an 
external agency, while the person has the resources to confront the event (Lazarus, 1991; 
Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985; Weiner, 1986). Research has also revealed that anger can additionally respond to a 
larger set of appraisals, elicitors, and conditions, such as goal obstacle, control, and unfairness 
(Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, 2003). However, Kuppens et al. (2003) found 
that none of the single appraisals studied were necessary or sufficient to elicit anger, 
suggesting that the elicitors of anger are complex and possibly dependent on the situation or 
individual. 
Anger can also become associated with a social group or action independently of any 
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appraisal of the situation, as part of an affective attitude. In a recent study, for example, 
Tapias, Glaser, Keltner, Vasquez and Wickens (2007, Study 3), primed social groups 
stereotypically associated either with anger (African-Americans) or disgust (gay men), and 
showed corresponding effects on measures of emotions. Considering that most discussions of 
taboo subjects such as incest or cannibalism involve examples where someone really is 
unjustly harmed, leading to anger, it is not surprising that anger should be associated with 
these taboo violations even when they are presented as absolutely harm-free. We propose that 
the presumption of harm, then, is a post-hoc elaboration made to justify anger that initially 
arises either from previous associations to the act, or from the simple consideration that 
another person is responsible for a negative act.  If moral anger usually arises from a situation 
when someone is harmed or where rights are violated, it is reasonable that when justifying 
anger in a moral situation lacking these features, its characteristic appraisals will be invoked.  
With sufficient cognitive resources, this anger becomes moralized, introducing an elaborated 
appraisal element of harm to others that is more suitable to moral than personal anger. 
Our model is consistent with the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001), in that the 
presumption of harm to others is one example of a post-hoc justification of an initial intuitive 
negative reaction based on the taboo violation.  The social intuitionist model also proposes 
that the intuitive emotional reaction is fast and effortless, compared with the effortful rational 
justification of actions based on their consequences. If this is indeed the case, a cognitive 
constraint should diminish the effortful post-hoc process—the presumption of harm—while 
sparing the effortless process, in this case the intuitive emotional reactions.  In a similar 
manner, Alicke’s culpable control model (2000) also proposes that judgments of harm and 
responsibility form a schema together with negative emotions of blame such as anger, in 
which the presence of each element increases the likelihood that the others will be perceived. 
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Empirical support for culpable control shows, for example, that when harm is greater, people 
also ascribe more responsibility to the person on an a posteriori basis.  Focusing more closely 
on anger, other research based on the “intuitive prosecutor” hypothesis has shown that 
unresolved anger at unpunished crimes leads to greater inferences of harm in subsequent 
unrelated cases (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999).  And, in support of the social-
intuitionist model, other research has shown that manipulations of disgust lead to more 
extreme moral judgments (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005).  While these results are suggestive, none 
of these previous models have drawn a distinction between anger and disgust as a trigger for 
the specific presumption of harm to others; our model specifically implicates anger, as 
opposed to the closely related emotion of disgust, in presumption of harm.  
To sum up, we propose that when a taboo-breaking act elicits both anger and disgust, 
it is anger specifically that can create the presumption of harm where none is described, by 
completing a schema, motivated or otherwise, in which moral anger requires justification 
through harm to others. When harm is described explicitly (Figure 1 A), there would be no 
need to presume harm, and the taboo-violating nature of an act would not affect inferences of 
harm or anger. Conversely, we predict that in conditions in which no harm to others is 
described (Figure 1 B), the presumption of harm is a post-hoc process used to justify a more 
intuitive anger reaction. While we expect a large main effect of described harmfulness on 
perceptions of harm, there should also be an interaction: a smaller increase in anger and 
perceptions of harm when no harm is described, if the act described violates a taboo (Figure 1 
C). In this case, anger but not disgust should predict presumption of harm.  
The presumption of harm explored here presents a novel alternative for investigating 
the relationship between harm and emotions. Although harm has been identified as one of the 
appraisals preceding the experience of anger, the use of harm as a justification for anger, 
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rather than as a reaction, has received less attention.  Our view of harm as a post-hoc, effortful 
justification would be supported by finding a presumption of harm to others from a taboo-
breaking act when no harm is explicitly described, and by the reduction of mean levels of 
presumption of harm, but not of emotions or judgments of moral wrongness, under conditions 
of cognitive constraint. 
Present Research: Overview 
 
The present research has two main objectives. The first one is to clarify the 
relationship between anger, disgust and harm in moral judgment by manipulating the presence 
or absence of harm to others and taboo violations. Measuring both anger and disgust at the 
same time—rather than offering a forced choice—allows us to compare the effects of the 
manipulations on both emotions, and to control for any correlation between them. To further 
clarify the difference between these two emotions, we included measures of action tendencies 
shown in previous research to be differentially associated with them: attack and punishment 
for anger, and avoidance for disgust (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 
2000). We expected that these action tendencies would respond to the manipulations of taboo 
and harm to others as the emotions would.  
The second objective is to establish the existence of anger, and the role of presumption 
of harm, in reactions to taboo actions that do not harm other people.  The relationship between 
intentionally caused negative outcomes and personal anger has previously been established, 
mostly by appraisal theories (e.g., Lazarus, 2001; Frijda, 1986; Roseman & Smith, 2001).  
However, these theories would not predict that anger in a moral situation specifically 
responds to harm to others (as opposed to negative outcomes in general), or that presumptions 
of harm are made post-hoc to justify anger.  In research, the specific appearance of moral 
anger toward taboo violations described as consensual and private has not yet been shown to 
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accompany presumption of harm to others, and has not been demonstrated via experimental 
manipulations of different kinds of described harm and taboo violations. The experiments 
presented here aimed to address these unknowns. 
Experiment 1 manipulated scenarios of different taboo violations to contain 
descriptions of harm to others, harm to the perpetrator of the action, and no harm for anyone. 
The main aims of this experiment were to establish the link between harm to others and anger 
as opposed to disgust, and to see whether presumption of harm to others occurred even in 
conditions in which no harm to others was present.  
In Experiment 2 the described harm to others and taboo-breaking nature of an act were 
both manipulated orthogonally with two main aims. Firstly, we wanted to clarify the effect of 
each independent manipulation on the presumption of harm to others. In addition to main 
effects of manipulated harmfulness on anger, and of taboo violation on disgust, an interaction 
between the manipulations of harm and taboo was expected, so that more harm would be 
presumed as a result of the taboo action only when no harm to others was described (Figure 1, 
panel C). The second aim was to investigate the post-hoc nature of this presumption of harm 
using a cognitive load manipulation. If harm is presumed through an effortful post-hoc 
process in order to justify an intuitive emotional moral judgment (figure 1, panel B), cognitive 
load should eliminate the effect of the taboo violation manipulation on mean levels of 
presumed harm, but not on mean levels of reported emotions or moral judgment, when 
judging a scenario described without harmful consequences.  In Experiment 2 we included 
measures of actual and symbolic harm, expecting that the latter would be easier to use as a 
justification because no actual harm was described.  
Experiment 3 was a partial replication of Experiment 2 that improved the wording of 
one of the questions about harm, in order to allow direct comparisons between the types of 
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harm described and to solve a potential problem with non-equivalence of the different harm 
questions. 
Experiment 1 
Our first experiment investigated to what extent angry and disgusted reactions to taboo 
violations are affected by different descriptions of harm, and to what extent harm to others is 
presumed, based on the description of the taboo-violating action, when no harm to other 
people is described. The experiment contained three different scenarios describing taboo 
violations: one involving necrophilia; another one involving consensual incest, based on Haidt 
et al. (1993); and a third scenario involving non-harmful cannibalism (eating a human steak 
grown from a cell culture). We manipulated the extent of harm by creating a version of each 
scenario where people other than the actors were explicitly psychologically harmed, as well as 
a version where nobody was harmed. A third harm condition presented each action as causing 
psychological harm to the actors in the scenario, but to nobody else.  This condition was 
meant to demonstrate that anger in this situation specifically responded to harm to others, 
rather than just the negative outcome of harm in general.   
We predicted the most negative emotional responses and judgments of harm to others 
in the condition in which others were harmed. However, we also expected some degree of 
presumption of harm to others in the remaining conditions, even when no such harm was 
described, and expected that this presumption would primarily be linked to anger rather than 
disgust. Finally, we predicted that anger and punishment would be more strongly influenced 
by our manipulation of harm to others, relative to disgust and avoidance. 





Ninety-four undergraduate psychology students at the University of Kent participated 
in the experiment in one of three sessions of a lecture. Seventy-two participants were female 
and 22 male. 
Materials 
The questionnaire presented three fictitious stories in which the main character or 
characters violated a different creatural taboo or social norm involving the body. The 
described consequences of these actions were manipulated to create three different 
harmfulness conditions. In the no consequences condition, there were no described negative 
consequences for anyone. In the harm self condition, the main character of the story was 
psychologically harmed, but no one else was harmed. In the harm others condition the main 
character was not harmed, but someone else was harmed psychologically (Appendix 1). Thus, 
the main independent variable was a three-level within-participants factor. 
The questionnaires were counterbalanced so that each participant received one 
variation (no consequences, harm to the self and harm to others) of each of the three different 
stories. Thus, each participant had one questionnaire consisting of one story with no 
consequences, another different story with the harm self variation, and a third different story 
with the harm to others variation. No participants received repeated scenarios or repeated 
variations of any of them. 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to read each story, and immediately afterwards to indicate if 
the action of the main character was right or wrong; these overall moral judgments were not 
Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla                                                           Anger, Disgust and Taboo    15 
 
 
central to this research and so will not be reported. After this, participants were asked to 
indicate if the action of the main character was beneficial or harmful to himself or herself 
(harm self manipulation check), and to people other than the main character (harm other 
manipulation check). Both judgments were made on bipolar scales from 1 (much more benefit 
than harm) to 9 (much more harm than benefit). Participants also indicated how much they 
would like to punish, and how much they would like to avoid, the main character of each 
story, on bipolar scales from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very). After this, participants were asked to 
indicated to what extent each story made them feel the following emotions: anger, 
compassion, depression, disgust, happiness, infuriation, outraged, pity, pleasure, repulsion, 
sadness, satisfaction, sickness, sorrow, sympathy, grossed-out, and contempt. These measures 
used a scale from 1 (not at all) to 8 (very). 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Analysis of variance using the harmfulness manipulation as a three-level within-
participants factor examined responses to the harm others manipulation check. This analysis 
(Table 1) revealed a significant effect of harmfulness, F (2,186) = 57.24, MSE = 121.53, p < 
.001; as expected, “harm others” stories were judged as more harmful to others than "no 
consequences" or “harm self” stories were. A similar analysis on perception of harm to self 
also revealed a significant effect of the manipulation, F (2, 186) = 12.71, MSE = 39.94, p < 
.001; protagonists of the "harm self" stories were perceived as more harmed than those of the 
"no consequences" and "harm others" stories. 
Moral judgment 
The effect of harmfulness on participants' moral judgment of the act's wrongness was 
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significant, F (2,186) = 19.14, MSE = 46.03, p < .001. Each level differed significantly from 
each other; the "harm others" versions were judged the most wrong, "harm self" second most 
wrong, and "no consequences" least wrong (Table 1). 
Anger and Disgust 
The index of all three anger items (angry, outraged, and infuriated), had Cronbach 
alpha = .91; while the index of all four disgust items (disgusted, sickened, repulsed, and 
grossed-out) had Cronbach alpha = .95. Correlations between these indexes were computed 
for each of the three harmfulness conditions, and were high across all three conditions: no 
consequences, r (92) = .77; harm self, r (92) = .78; harm others r (92) = .82. In varimax-
rotated principal components factor analyses, when only the anger and disgust items were 
analyzed and the model was constrained to produce two factors, all three conditions showed 
the three anger items principally loading on one factor and the disgust items on the other. 
Thus, while anger and disgust were closely related, the items also could be reliably 
differentiated. 
To investigate whether harmfulness influenced relative levels of anger versus disgust, 
we conducted a mixed-model 2 x 3 ANOVA with the harm manipulation as a three-level 
within-participants factor, and anger vs. disgust as a two-level within-participants factor. The 
main effect of anger vs. disgust was significant, F (1, 186) = 139.52, MSE = 1.76, p < .001, 
indicating higher overall levels of disgust than anger; harmfulness also had a significant main 
effect, F (2, 186) = 13.22, MSE = 4.87, p < .001, indicating more negative affect in harm 
others versus no harm conditions. Of greater importance, the interaction of harmfulness with 
anger vs. disgust was significant, F (2, 186) = 8.09, MSE = .61, p < .001. The means (Table 
1) showed that levels of anger, relative to disgust, were more influenced by the manipulation 
of harm to others; so that the difference between anger and disgust grew smaller in the "harm 
Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla                                                           Anger, Disgust and Taboo    17 
 
 
others" condition relative to the other two conditions. In order to confirm the effect of the 
harmfulness manipulation on anger but not on disgust given that the emotions were highly 
correlated, a multilevel data analysis (Kenny, Kashy & Bolger, 1998) was also conducted. 
This revealed that harmfulness influenced anger independently of disgust, F (2, 277) = 26.97, 
MSE = 1.08, p < .001.  Specifically, harm others scenarios evoked more anger (Madjusted = 
4.75, SE = 0.11) than did no consequences (Madjusted = 3.83, SE = 0.11) or harm self (Madjusted 
= 3.79, SE = 0.11) scenarios; both comparisons were significant (p < .001). The manipulation 
did not affect disgust independent of anger, F (2, 277) = 0.49, MSE = 1.15, ns. 
Presumption of Harm 
The item regarding harm to others was used to test for the presumption of harm in the 
no consequences and harm self conditions. On the nine-point scale used, the reported harm to 
others in the no consequences conditions (6.07) was significantly higher than the midpoint of 
the scale (i.e. towards the “harmful” side), t (93) = 6.32, p < .001. In the harm self condition, 
the overall mean (5.99) was also significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale, t (93) = 
6.20, p < .001. Importantly, these effects were present in each scenario separately. 
We had predicted that harm to others would be associated with anger but not with 
disgust. Anger and disgust were used as simultaneous predictors of harm to others for the two 
conditions in which harm to others was presumed rather than described: no consequences and 
harm self. A multilevel data analysis was again used, revealing that among the no 
consequences scenarios, anger was associated with perceived harm to others, β = .36, p < .05, 
but disgust was not, β = .04, p = .78. Likewise, among the "harm self" stories, anger was 
associated with perceived harm to others, β = .38, p < .05, but disgust was not, β = -.12, p = 
.44. This indicates that when harm to others was not explicitly described, anger but not 
disgust was associated with the presumption of harm. 




A 2 x 3 analysis similar to the one used for the emotion items was performed on the 
action tendencies, substituting the emotions for the action tendencies as a within-participants 
factor. The main effect of punishment vs. avoidance was significant, F (1, 186) = 152.26, 
MSE = 558.01, p < .001, indicating higher overall levels of avoidance than punishment. 
Harmfulness also had a significant main effect, F (2, 186) = 9.20, MSE = 88.67, p < .001, 
indicating more general willingness to take any kind of action in harm others versus the other 
conditions.  The expected interaction of harmfulness with punishment vs. avoidance was also 
significant, F (2, 186) = 5.73, MSE = 11.43, p = .004.  The harm manipulation increased 
punishment more so than avoidance, leading to a lower difference between the two in the 
harm others conditions (Table 1).  
Regression analyses were performed for the whole sample to test our general 
predictions about the correspondence between emotions and action tendencies. These analyses 
followed the multilevel analytic model of the previous section because the tendencies of 
avoidance and punishment were correlated across scenarios (r = .64). As expected, only anger 
(β = .39, p < .001) and not disgust (β = -.12, p < .05) positively predicted punishment 
independently of avoidance. Also, disgust (β = .31, p < .001) but not anger (β = .07, p = .30) 
predicted avoidance independently of punishment. These findings reinforce the expected 
correspondence between emotions and action tendencies, and provide another basis to 
differentiate between these two highly correlated emotions. 
Discussion 
Results of this experiment supported our prediction regarding presumption of harm. 
As expected, the highest level of harm to others was reported in the harm others conditions. 
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However, harm (versus benefit) to others was higher than the scale midpoint in the no 
consequences and the harm self conditions, suggesting presumption of harm. These 
presumptions of harm were associated with anger but not with disgust, although the two 
emotions were highly correlated in all the conditions. This effect was especially clear when 
the harm was presumed and not described. Despite the high correlation between the two 
emotions, in regression analyses, the harm to others manipulation affected anger 
independently of disgust, but not vice versa. Importantly, the harm to self manipulation did 
not have this effect, showing that moral anger depends on more than a negative outcome. 
Our predictions about action tendencies were also supported. Results showed that 
anger was associated with punishment but not avoidance, while disgust was associated with 
avoidance but not punishment, when the shared variance between the two action tendencies 
was controlled for. These results in the domain of moral emotions further support existing 
findings on the difference in appraisals and action tendencies between these two emotions, 
and make the distinctions between these emotions more clear. 
Despite these findings using regression methods, the high correlation between the 
separate measures of disgust and anger still presented a limitation. We thought it probable that 
the use of verbal measures alone was responsible for the high correlation, based on the 
tendency to use words and synonyms related to the emotion of disgust as metaphors for 
feelings more akin to the emotion of anger (Nabi, 2002). Fortunately, because disgust and 
anger are considered basic emotions, it was also possible to differentiate them on the basis of 
emotional facial expressions. Therefore measures of these emotions using endorsement of 
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All the scenarios in Experiment 1 contained elements of taboo violation (inappropriate 
sexual acts, unusual food, and contact with the dead), but only in some conditions were they 
described as harming others. Although results suggested a presumption of harm to others in 
the three stories used, Experiment 1 did not include any control conditions in which no taboo 
violations were described.  In addition, a clearer demonstration of the effect of presumption of 
harm might be expected as a result of manipulating the content of only a single story (the 
“scientist” story from Experiment 1). In order to more clearly confirm a presumption of harm 
based only on taboo violation, in Experiment 2 the presence of harm to others and taboo 
violation were manipulated orthogonally, so that their independent effects could be assessed. 
We expected to find a greater presumption of harm due to the taboo manipulation in the 
conditions where harm was not described, but equal inference of harm in the taboo and non-
taboo conditions where harm was explicitly described.  As in Experiment 1, the manipulation 
of harmfulness to others should affect anger and punishment more strongly than disgust and 
avoidance. In addition, we predicted that the manipulation of taboo would affect disgust and 
avoidance more strongly than anger and punishment, but that it would create a minor increase 
in anger and presumed harm in conditions when there was no actual harm to others described 
– in other words, a Harmfulness x Taboo interaction effect (see figure 1C). 
Another improvement in Experiment 2 is related to investigating the nature of 
presumed harm. As defined by Rozin et al. (1999), autonomy ethics state that an action is 
wrong “because it directly hurts another person, or infringes upon his/her rights or freedoms 
as an individual” (p. 575). Results from Experiment 1 left unclear whether the presumption of 
harm related to anger was literal or symbolic (e.g., infringing rights). This distinction is 
important because symbolic harm rather than actual harm would be more plausible in this 
context to use as a justification of a negative reaction, as predicted by the social intuitionist 
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model.  We therefore added a symbolic harm measure of rights violation. 
A third improvement in Experiment 2 was a manipulation of cognitive load. Cognitive 
processing performed with a concurrent “load” task, such monitoring text or remembering a 
long number, tends to rely upon more automatic and less effortful processes, without the 
benefit of deliberative correction (e.g., Gilbert, Tafarodi & Malone, 1993). Therefore, in our 
model, cognitive load should impair the process of justifying the negative intuitive moral 
judgment, but not the judgment itself . We should see that in the harm-free conditions, the 
effect of taboo violation on mean levels of presumed harm is high without cognitive load, but 
reduced under cognitive load, whereas there is no such reduction of emotional or moral 
disapproval. Moreover, because we expect that harm to symbolic entities—in this case the 
rights of other people—will be easier to justify than actual harm, it is symbolic rather than 
actual harm judgments that should be reduced by cognitive load in the expected way. 
Finally, a fourth improvement, to reduce the high correlation between anger and 
disgust, was the measurement of these emotions via judgments of facial expression images. 
Although the multiple regression techniques we used in Experiment 1 address this potential 
problem by excluding variance shared by words of anger and disgust, we now included 
measures of endorsement of emotional expressions to supplement our verbal measures.  These 
expressions were similar to those used by Rozin et al. (1999).  We expected a reduction in the 
correlation between anger and disgust once expression-based measures were included. 
It was expected that these four improvements (the orthogonal design of the 
manipulations, the inclusion of facial expressions of emotions, the manipulation of cognitive 
load, and the differences between symbolic and actual harm), would clarify the role of the 
presumption of harm to others and reveal its post-hoc nature. We also sought to replicate the 
relationship between harm and anger in conditions where harm to others was not described, 
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but rather presumed. 
Method 
Participants 
One-hundred and ninety-four undergraduate psychology students from the same 
university as Experiment 1’s participants, 165 females and 29 males, received partial course 
credit in return for participation. 
Design 
This experiment had a 2 (Harmfulness: no harm to others vs. harm to others) x 2 
(Taboo: taboo action vs. non-taboo action) x 2 (Load: load vs. no load) between participants 
design. 
Materials 
The questionnaire presented a fictitious scenario that was manipulated to create four 
different variations based on two criteria: Whether someone else apart from the main 
character was harmed or not, and whether the action performed by the main character broke a 
taboo (in this case, the one against eating human flesh) or not (Appendix 2). The scenario was 
based on the "no harm" and "harm to others" versions of the "scientist" scenario used in 
Experiment 1. 
All responses were given on nine-point bipolar semantic differential scales, unless 
otherwise indicated. The order in which the questions were presented was partially 
counterbalanced in three different forms, so that evaluations, harm and emotions each came 
first for approximately a third of the sample, with the other questions following in a cyclical 
order (e.g., emotions first, then evaluations and harm). Action tendencies and load 
manipulation checks, however, always came last. 
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Moral disapproval. The questionnaire contained four moral evaluation items 
(completely right / completely wrong; good / bad; correct / incorrect; positive / negative). 
Harm. Two questions regarding the perceived level of harm to others were included: 
"Do you think the action of the scientist was harmful or beneficial for any other people apart 
from her" (completely harmful / completely beneficial) and "Do you think the action of the 
scientist violated the rights of any other people apart from her" (not at all / extremely).  
Emotion items. In the face emotion items, two photographs of female faces were 
shown, one showing disgust in the full form and the other showing anger in the open mouth 
form. The photos were 70 mm x 55 mm in black and white and were taken from Rozin et al. 
(1999). Participants were instructed to "select the face that best describes your feelings 
towards the scientist now", and then asked to indicate separately how much of each of the 
feelings represented by each face (anger or disgust) they had towards the scientist (not at all / 
extremely). In the verbal emotion items, participants were asked to indicated to what extent 
each story made them feel anger, compassion, depression, disgust, happiness, infuriation, 
outraged, pity, pleasure, repulsion, sadness, satisfaction, sickness, sorrow, sympathy, grossed-
out and contempt. These measures used scales from 1 (not at all) to 8 (very).  
Action tendencies. Participants then were asked to indicate two action tendencies: 
punishment and avoidance, each one measured using two items. For punishment the items 
were "How much would you like to punish the scientist?" and "How much would you like to 
publicly condemn the scientist?"; for avoidance, they were "How much would you like to 
avoid the scientist?" and "How much would you like to move away from the scientist?" 
Load manipulation checks. At the end of the experiment, participants were requested 
to write down the number they were asked to memorize, and to answer four nine-point items 
that measured if being asked to remember the number was irritating, annoying, difficult and 
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distracting (not at all / extremely).  
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of between 10 and 25, and they did not interact with 
each other. The experiment was introduced as an study to measure how well people could 
judge the actions of someone while they had to remember a number. Each group was 
randomly assigned to one of two cognitive load conditions: load or no load.  
At the beginning of the session, the experimenter presented a large piece of paper 
showing a number to the participants for 90 seconds, and asked them to remember it for the 
duration of the experiment. A seven digit number was presented in the cognitive load 
condition, while the number 1 was presented in the no load condition.  
After the presentation of the number, participants were given a packet of printed 
materials.  They first read the scenario corresponding to their experimental condition, and 
then completed the response measures as described above. 
Results 
Cognitive Load 
Of the 194 participants, 12 reported the load number incorrectly, all of them in the 
load condition. These were excluded from the analyses. 
The two items related to the difficulty of the task (if the task was difficult and 
distracting), being correlated at r (180) = .77, were averaged to create a single score. A 2 
(Harmfulness) x 2 (Taboo) x 2 (Load) between participants ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of load, F (1, 174) = 144.50, MSE = 3.15, p < .001, with no other effects 
significant, showing that the load manipulation increased subjective difficulty.  
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The "irritating" and "annoying" items, correlated at r (180) = .88, were averaged and 
subjected to the same ANOVA; only load affected this variable, F (1, 174) = 54.30, MSE = 
3.92, p < .001, such that participants under load reported the number task to be more 
irritating, M = 3.99, SD = 2.39, than participants under no load, M = 1.82, SD = 1.46. 
However, load irritation was not significantly related to anger, r (180) = -.08, ns, to disgust, r 
(180) = .00, or to any of the other dependent variables studied. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
irritation from load itself influenced emotional responses. 
Moral Judgment 
The four moral judgment items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach alpha = .90) and so 
were combined to create one single score, where high numbers meant more judged 
wrongness. ANOVA on this score showed significant main effects of harmfulness, F (1, 174) 
= 27.50, MSE = 2.19, p < .001, indicating more negative evaluation in the harmful condition 
than in the harmless one; and of taboo, F (1, 174) = 8.70, MSE = 2.19, p < .01, showing more 
negative evaluation for the taboo action than the non-taboo one.  A marginally significant 
interaction between these two factors was also present, F (1, 174) = 3.76, MSE = 2.19, p = 
.054. Simple effects analysis showed that only in the harmless condition did the type of action 
affect the evaluation, showing a more negative evaluation of the harmless but taboo action (M 
= 6.39, SD = 1.59), than when the action was not taboo (M = 5.29, SD = 1.48) in line with the 
pattern shown in Figure 1C. Load did not moderate any of these effects, consistent with an 
interpretation of moral judgment as relatively intuitive. 
Presumption of Harm 
The items measuring actual harm vs. benefit to others and symbolic harm (violation of 
rights) were correlated at r (180) = .51, p < .001. An additional within-participants factor of 
Item (actual harm vs. symbolic harm) was added to the basic design. Overall, there was a 
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main effect of the harmfulness manipulation, F (1, 174) = 198.52, MSE = 4.29, p < .001, such 
that it raised judgments both of actual harm and violation of rights. There was also a 
significant Harmfulness x Item interaction, F (1, 174) = 128.40, MSE = 1.98, p < .001. The 
effect of the harmfulness manipulation increased symbolic harm (difference between harmful 
and not harmful means = 4.73) more than it did actual harm (difference between means = 
1.37). Finally, there was a significant Harmfulness x Taboo x Item interaction corresponding 
to the predicted presumption of harm effect, F (1, 174) = 4.04, MSE = 1.98, p < .05. Simple 
effects analysis of each type of harm within each level of Harmfulness showed that only for 
symbolic harm was there a significant presumption of harm based on the effects of the taboo 
manipulation, and only in the condition in which no harm to others was described, F (1,174) = 
5.77, p < .05. 
It was expected that cognitive load would moderate the presumption of harm. In order 
to investigate this prediction, further breaking down the previous result by Load showed that 
the simple effect of taboo on symbolic harm was significant, F (1, 174) = 4.54, p < .05, when 
no harm to others was presented and without cognitive load (Figure 2), whereas the 
comparable effect under load was not, F (1, 174) = 1.38, p = .23. However, as the overall 
interaction of harmfulness, taboo and load on symbolic harm was not significant, F (1, 174) = 
.08, MSE = 3.42, p = .78, this result must be interpreted cautiously. 
Anger and Disgust 
Words for anger (alpha = .89) and disgust (alpha = .95) once again formed reliable 
indices. Anger words correlated more strongly with the scaled endorsement of the anger face, 
r (180) = .38, p < .001, than disgust words did, r (180) = .22, p < .01; and the difference 
between dependent correlations was significant, t (179) = 2.84, p < .01. Likewise, disgust 
words were correlated more strongly with the disgust face, r (180) = .49, p < .001, than anger 
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words did, r (180) = .19, p < .05; this difference was also significant, t (179) = 5.78, p < .001. 
On this basis two composite emotion measures were created, averaging the standardized score 
for each word index with the standardized score for its corresponding facial measure. These 
indices were correlated less strongly than the indices in Experiment 1 were, r (180) = .331, so 
that we did not feel it necessary to use the other emotion as a covariate. 
A Harmfulness x Taboo x Load ANOVA on anger showed a significant main effect of 
harmfulness, F (1, 174) = 17.81, MSE = 0.59, p < .001; scenarios described as harmful to 
others aroused greater anger. Taboo did not have a main effect on anger, F (1, 174) = 2.17, 
MSE = 0.59, p =.14, but there was a significant Harmfulness x Taboo interaction, F (1, 174) = 
9.78, MSE = 0.59, p < .01. Simple effects tests (Figure 3) indicated that when no harm to 
others was described, the taboo nature of the act increased anger, but that there was no such 
effect in conditions describing harm to others.  Load had no significant main or interactive 
effects. 
A similar ANOVA on disgust showed a significant main effect of taboo, F (1, 174) = 
157.23, MSE = 0.39, p < .001; taboo scenarios aroused greater disgust. Harmfulness did not 
have a main effect on disgust, F (1, 174) = 1.56, MSE = 0.39, p =.21, but there was a 
significant Harmfulness x Taboo interaction, F (1, 174) = 12.37, MSE = 0.39, p < .01. Simple 
effects tests (Figure 3) indicated that when both harm and no harm were described, taboo 
increased disgust, but that the effect of taboo was larger when no harm was described. Again, 
there were no significant main or interactive effects of load on disgust. An analysis adding 
anger versus disgust (Emotion) as a within-participants factor to the basic design confirmed 
that anger and disgust showed different patterns of influence by the manipulations of harm to 
others (Emotion x Harmfulness F (1, 174) = 8.54, MSE = 0.34, p < .01); and by taboo 
violation (Emotion x Taboo F (1, 174) = 63.56, MSE = 0.34, p < .001).  Taken together, these 
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main and interactive effects confirm our predictions for anger and disgust in Figure 1C. 
Based on the findings of Experiment 1, it was predicted that anger and not disgust 
would be associated with presumed harm to others. As in Experiment 1, focusing on the taboo 
violation, no harm condition, a regression analysis using anger and disgust as predictors of 
symbolic harm confirmed that anger was associated with symbolic harm, β = .46, p < .01, 
independently of disgust, which was not; β = -.18, ns. When actual harm versus benefit was 
used as the dependent variable, neither anger nor disgust showed significant effects. 
Action Tendencies 
The two punishment items were correlated at r (180) = .68, and the two avoidance 
items, at r (180) = .78, so each pair of items was averaged. Due to the high correlation 
between punishment and avoidance (r = .58), each one was added as a covariate in the 
analysis of the other. 
A Harmfulness x Taboo x Load ANOVA on punishment showed significant main 
effects of Harmfulness, F (1, 173) = 8.38, MSE = 2.85, p < .01, and Load, F (1, 173) = 9.58, 
MSE = 2.85, p < .01, but not Taboo, F (1, 173) = 0.01, MSE = 2.85.   As expected, 
punishment increased when harm was described (no harm Madjusted  = 3.54, harm Madjusted  = 
4.29).  No interactions were significant. 
A similar analysis on avoidance revealed significant main effects of Taboo, F (1, 173) 
= 11.53, MSE = 3.55, p < .001 but not Harmfulness, F (1, 173) = 2.44, MSE = 3.55, p = .12, 
qualified by a significant interaction between them, F (1, 173) = 9.89, MSE = 3.55, p < .01. 
The pattern of this interaction showed a greater effect of taboo on avoidance when harm was 
not described (no taboo Madjusted  = 3.67, taboo Madjusted  = 5.72) than when it was described 
(no taboo Madjusted  = 5.29, taboo Madjusted  = 5.22).  No effects involving load were significant. 
As in Experiment 1, regression analyses confirmed that only anger (β = .30, p < .001) 
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and not disgust (β = .00, p = .98) predicted punishment independently of avoidance. 
Conversely, disgust (β = .16, p < .05) but not anger (β = .05, p = .48) predicted avoidance 
independently of punishment. 
Discussion 
The independent manipulations of taboo and harm to others in Experiment 2 allowed 
us to further investigate the relationship between taboo violations and harm. As in Experiment 
1, the manipulation of harm to others influenced anger and punishment overall as a main 
effect, but not disgust. Likewise, the manipulation of taboo violation affected disgust and 
avoidance, but not anger. Disgust was also related to avoidant action tendencies, whereas 
anger was related to attack action tendencies, drawing a further distinction between these two 
correlated emotions. Moreover, emotional responses were not moderated by load, suggesting 
that they were preserved even under cognitive constraint.  
The results further clarified the nature of the harm inferred from our manipulations. 
When participants were able to judge symbolic as well as actual harm to others, the 
manipulation of taboo affected symbolic harm to a greater extent than the measure assessing 
harm versus benefit. The presumption of harm based on the taboo violation was significant 
only for the measure of rights violation, which in turn was significant only without cognitive 
load, as we predicted. However, the difference between load and no load conditions was not 
reflected in the expected significant interaction.   
As predicted, and replicating the findings of Experiment 1, anger was the only 
emotion associated with presumed harm from a taboo violation that does not harm other 
people. Importantly, anger was associated only with symbolic harm, not with actual harm 
versus benefit, and disgust was not a significant predictor of harm. 






Although Experiment 2 further clarified the presumption of harm to others based on a 
taboo violation, it was expected that this effect would be moderated by cognitive load. Indeed, 
the effect was significant under no load and not under load, but the expected higher order 
interaction did not emerge as significant. One limitation is that the measure of actual harm 
was not equivalent to the measure of symbolic harm, because the actual harm measure was 
bipolar, asking for a judgment of harm versus benefit. It is plausible to think that the benefit 
associated with the action (e.g., seeing the actions of the scientist as a valuable experiment) 
was involved in judgments of the actual harm measure, while this complication was not 
present in the symbolic harm measure.  
An improvement would present measures of symbolic and actual harm that were 
worded in exact parallel, such that deliberative thought could conclusively reject the 
implausible judgment of actual harm in favor of the more plausible judgment of symbolic 
harm. This improvement would also allow us to compare the measures of harm more clearly. 
To address this issue, Experiment 3 partially replicated Experiment 2, focusing on the 
conditions that did not describe harm, while retaining the factors of taboo and load.  The 
bipolar measure of actual harm and benefit was substituted by unipolar measures. We 
expected that with this procedural change the findings of Experiment 2 would be replicated—
a presumption of symbolic harm, without harm to others and only without cognitive load—
but that the effect of cognitive load would be present not only as a difference between simple 
effects, but as a significant interaction that would indicate post-hoc reasoning. 





One hundred and nine undergraduate psychology students at the University of Kent 
and the University of Sussex participated in the experiment for partial course credit. Of these, 
93 were female and 16 were male.  
Design 
The experiment had a 2 (Taboo: taboo action vs. no taboo action) x 2 (Load: No Load 
vs. Cognitive Load) between participants design. 
Materials 
This experiment was presented through a program on a personal computer. The 
measures and procedure were identical to Experiment 2’s except that all participants were in 
the conditions that did not describe harm to others. The questions associated with measures of 
perceived harm were changed: “To what extent do you think the action of the scientist was 
harmful to herself?”, “To what extent do you think the action of the scientist was beneficial to 
herself?”, “To what extent do you think the action of the scientist was harmful to anyone else 
apart from the scientist?”, “To what extent do you think the action of the scientist was 
beneficial to anyone else apart from the scientist?” and “Do you think the action of the 
scientist violated the rights of anyone apart from her?” The analyses will focus on the 
questions about harm rather than benefit, and harm to others rather than self. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups between 5 and 20. In each session individual 
participants were asked to sit in front of one computer in which the questionnaire was 
presented. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions and also to one 
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of the two tasks.  
Results 
Manipulation Check  
Fourteen participants, all in the cognitive load condition, reported the cognitive load 
number incorrectly and were excluded from the analyses, leaving 95 participants. 
Presumption of Harm 
The perceived harm to others and symbolic harm items were analysed using a mixed 
model analysis of variance with a 2 (Harm Type: others vs. symbolic, within participants) 
added to the basic design. Results showed a significant main effect of Harm Type, F (1, 91) = 
8.20, MSE = 1.12, p < .01, showing a higher overall perception of harm to others (M = 3.41, 
SD = 2.23) than symbolic harm (M = 3.00, SD = 2.09). More importantly, a significant Harm 
Type x Taboo interaction was present, F (1, 91) = 6.31, MSE = 1.12, p < .05. As in 
Experiment 2, simple effects analyses showed that perceptions of symbolic harm were higher 
for the taboo scenario (M = 3.45, SD = 2.47) than the non-taboo scenario (M = 2.56, SD = 
1.53), F (1, 91) = 16.58, p < .001. Moreover, taboo had no effect on perceptions of actual 
harm, F (1, 91) = 0.19, p = .67. As expected, this effect was further moderated by a significant 
Harm Type x Taboo x Load interaction, F (1, 91) = 8.23, MSE = 1.12, p < .01. Simple effects 
analyses comparing actual with symbolic harm showed that under load, the taboo 
manipulation increased symbolic harm, F (1,91) = 4.43, p < .05; while this did not occur 
without load, F (1,91) = 1.27, p = .26 (Figure 4). Therefore, as predicted, only symbolic harm 
was presumed, and only under no load. 
Moral Judgment 
The four items measuring moral judgment (Cronbach’s alpha = .90) were averaged 
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and analysed, revealing a significant main effect of Taboo, F (1, 91) = 8.26, MSE = 2.16, p < 
.01, indicating that the taboo action was evaluated as more wrong (M = 6.12, SD = 1.34) than 
the no taboo action (M = 5.27, SD = 1.57). The main effect of Load and the interaction 
between the two factors were not significant (all p > .25). 
Anger and Disgust 
As in Experiment 2, the anger face was more correlated with anger words, r (93) = 
.73, than with disgust words, r (93) = .52, and the difference between correlations was 
significant, t (92) = 3.70, p <.001, while disgust words were more correlated with the disgust 
face, r (93) = .76, than anger words were, r (93) = .54, t (92) = 4.16, p <.001. The same 
procedure as in Experiment 2 was used to create one index for each emotion. These indices 
were correlated at r = .64. 
A 2 (Taboo) x 2 (Load) ANOVA on anger revealed a marginal main effect of taboo, F 
(1, 91) = 3.19, MSE = 0.93, p = .08; taboo tended to increase mean levels of anger (Figure 5). 
A similar analysis on the disgust index revealed a much stronger significant main effect of 
taboo, F (1, 91) = 56.60, MSE = 0.62, p < .001 (Figure 5); the taboo condition aroused more 
disgust than the control condition.  These results, within Experiment 3’s partial design, again 
confirm the predictions of Figure 1C.  Finally, adding a within-participants factor of emotion 
(anger vs. disgust) to the design yielded a significant Taboo x Emotion interaction confirming 
that the taboo manipulation affected disgust more than anger, F (1, 91) = 34.50, MSE = 0.25, 
p < .001. The main effect of load and interactions with load were not significant for either 
emotion (all p > .40). 
As in Experiment 2, regression analysis was used to investigate the effect of anger and 
disgust on the presumption of harm. Anger was again associated with perceived symbolic 
harm, β = .64, p < .001, while disgust was not; β = -.09, ns. This pattern was repeated for 
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actual harm (β = .57, p < .01 for anger, and β = -.09, ns, for disgust). Again, moral anger and 
not disgust was associated with the presumption of harm. 
Action Tendencies 
The two items regarding punishment, r (93) = .84, p < .001, and the two items 
regarding avoidance, r (93) = .87, p < .001, were each averaged to create one index for each 
action tendency, and these indices were correlated at r =.58. A 2 (Taboo) x 2 (Load) ANOVA 
on punishment controlling for avoidance revealed no significant main effects or interactions 
(all p > .36). A similar analysis on avoidance showed only a significant main effect of Taboo 
F (1, 90) = 12.97, MSE = 3.40, p < .001, so that avoidance was higher in the taboo condition 
(Madjusted) = 4.36 than in the non-taboo condition (Madjusted = 3.68).  Across all conditions, 
anger (β = .47, p <.001) but not disgust (β = .07, p = .53) predicted punishment. Only disgust 
(β = .53, p <.001) but not anger (β = .03, p =.77), was a significant predictor of avoidance. 
General Discussion 
Presumption of Harm 
Results of these three experiments supported our model explaining the presumption of 
harm to others from a taboo violation as a post-hoc justification of anger. In Experiment 1, 
taboo-violating scenarios explicitly described as being private and consensual nonetheless led 
to levels of presumed harm to others higher than the midpoint of the scale. Although this 
result was suggestive rather than conclusive, Experiments 2 and 3 confirmed the presumption 
of harm based on independent manipulations of harm to others and taboo violation.  In 
conditions in which taboo violation and no harm to others was described, participants 
nonetheless inferred harm to others. This inference took the form of violation of rights when 
such an option was offered, plausibly because it was a more defensible inference than actual 
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harm to others, under conditions where the act was explicitly described as private and not 
involving others at all.  Importantly, this presumption of harm was associated with the 
emotion anger and not disgust across all studies. Our results more systematically confirm 
previous findings in which harm was inferred in connection to a private, consensual taboo 
violation.  They establish the presumption of harm as a reaction to taboo violations only when 
harm is not explicitly described, establish the presumption of harm as linked specifically to 
anger, and show that, when given the option to do so, participants will describe the presumed 
harm as symbolic rather than actual.  
When actual harm was measured separately from benefit in Experiment 3, the 
interaction between harm, cognitive load, and taboo violation showed that participants 
presumed symbolic rather than actual harm from a harmless taboo violation without cognitive 
load; whereas under load there was no such tendency. Moreover, cognitive load did not 
moderate the reported levels of anger or disgust, or the moral judgment of the act as right or 
wrong. These results support our hypothesis regarding the post-hoc nature of the presumption 
of harm based on the social intuitionist model, in the sense that an immediate and intuitive 
emotional moral response to the taboo violation was later justified through the presumption of 
harm, to the extent that it specifically involved anger rather than disgust. When cognitive load 
was present, the presumption of symbolic harm as a form of justification was not made.  
Emotions and Action Tendencies 
The moderate to high correlations we found between anger and disgust further support 
their categorization within the family of moral emotions (Haidt, 2003). However, these 
experiments provided evidence for distinct antecedents of moral anger and moral disgust. The 
manipulations of harm to others consistently affected anger and punishment more than disgust 
and avoidance. Likewise, manipulations of taboo violations affected disgust and avoidance to 
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a greater degree than anger an punishment. Supporting our explanation of presumption of 
harm, the manipulations of taboo also elicited a certain degree of anger when no harm was 
explicitly described, which was uniquely associated with presumed harm to others. 
Despite high correlations between the action tendencies of punishment and avoidance, 
it is important to notice that across our studies, anger predicted the action tendency toward 
punishment independently of disgust. Likewise, disgust predicted the action tendency toward 
avoidance independently of anger. Although these relationships can be theoretically predicted, 
the inclusion of measures of action tendencies further clarified the distinctions between anger 
and disgust in conditions wherein these emotions were highly correlated. 
Theoretical Implications 
The results presented here remind us that emotions not only can be studied as a 
response towards specific situations or appraisals, but that emotions can also have influence 
on appraisals and judgments. In particular, the strong association between harm and anger 
indicates that harm can be seen not only an elicitor of anger, but also as a response to it, based 
on the disappearance of presumption of harm but not anger under cognitive load. These 
findings reinforce the assumptions of the social intuitionist model, the “intuitive prosecutor” 
hypothesis, and related ideas (e.g., Lerner & Tiedens, 2006), by showing that presumption of 
harm can be used as an elaborated justification to an emotional reaction. These results also 
give empirical support to the post-hoc nature of such processes previously assumed by Haidt 
and Hersh (2001) and demonstrated by Goldberg et al. (1999), but additionally manipulating 
the nature of the violation in order to more clearly investigate the roles of anger and disgust, 
and the important association of anger with harm. 
More specifically, these results extend and clarify the roles of anger and disgust as 
moral emotions as proposed by the CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin et al., 1999). The use of 
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independent ratings of emotions rather than forced choices, and the manipulation of the 
contents of similar scenarios rather than comparing holistically different ones, confirm the 
assertion that moral anger primarily arises from transgressions of the ethics of autonomy, 
including harm and violations of rights. Similarly, experiments 2 and 3 showed that 
systematically varying the extent to which an act constituted a creatural taboo violation 
involving the body (cannibalism), led to increased disgust. Although our results mostly 
support the proposals of the CAD hypothesis, it may be premature to limit the emotional 
response of disgust to the ethics of divinity, and anger to the ethics of autonomy. The 
discovery of lesser but significant increases in anger when a harmless taboo violation was 
described indicates that, even though such a scenario may arouse disgust as the prevailing 
response, it also brings up some degree of anger when compared to a harmless act that does 
not involve violating a taboo.   
The results presented here raise the question whether anger comes from socially 
learned associations to a taboo act, or from basic reactions to it. On one hand, it is plausible to 
think that most cases of (e.g.) cannibalism are indeed harmful to others, so that anger is 
associated with any thought of eating human meat, even if technology renders it innocuous. 
On the other hand, it is also plausible to think that acts such as incest and cannibalism are 
noxious to contemplate, so that a basic, non-moral form of anger is evoked in more primitive 
reactions to these stimuli (Berkowitz, 1999). The degree to which these processes each 
contribute to anger towards harmless taboo violations awaits future clarification. 
General Implications 
Investigating the differences between anger and disgust is important not only in terms 
of theory, but also in practical applications to intergroup relations. Although these 
experiments employed extreme and even bizarre cases to explore the presumption of harm, 
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other results show that homosexuality can elicit an equally visceral disgust reaction (Cottrell 
& Neuberg, 2005; Haidt & Hersh, 2001). In fact, we used our more arcane examples because 
we wanted to tap issues in which social norms against prejudice would not interfere with 
honest expression of emotional reaction and moral judgment. Therefore, describing behaviors 
not protected even by the most liberal norms of tolerance can possibly shed some light on the 
role of the emotions among those who themselves reject norms of tolerance towards gays and 
other sexual minorities. 
Extending existing results on sexual prejudice, we showed that the reactions to taboo 
violations are not limited to the avoidance of the person performing the action but that anger 
and punitive action tendencies can also occur, even in cases when the actions are harmless, 
private and consensual. These results can partially explain some of the hostile reactions 
towards some groups, such as homosexuals, based mostly on the violations of symbolic 
values and moral norms, and not on actual harm to other people. These reactions may be 
intensified by the usual relationship between taboo violations and actual harm. In most cases 
of creatural taboo transgressions, such as cannibalism or incest, the result is usually direct 
harm to others, creating a strong association between harm and anger. It is plausible to think 
that this association is present even when there is no harm described, so that when anger is 
evoked, harm is related to it (Alicke, 2000). It is not out of the question that similar anger 
reactions could be associated with gay men, for a person raised to think that homosexuals 
were especially likely to molest children, sexually transmit disease, and spread their lifestyle 
to unwilling others – all beliefs characteristic of anti-gay attitudes (Herek, Widaman & 
Capitanio, 2005). 
The distinction between symbolic and actual harm revealed that a taboo violation can 
be perceived as having negative consequences for others, even as the result of private and 
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consensual actions. Although our research does not directly address the extent to which post-
hoc presumption of harm is a motivated process explicitly driven by values, rather than a 
mere byproduct of emotional associations, other research does show that violations of sexual 
morality elicit presumption of harm primarily among political conservatives (Haidt & Hersh, 
2001).  This points to an effect that, in some domains, interacts with systems of values and 
morality.  Cultural conservatives, for example, often claim that opposite-sex marriages are 
somehow harmed by extending marriage rights to same-sex couples, as shown by the title of 
the “Defense of Marriage Act”. Arguments such as this, baffling as they may be to supporters 
of liberal standards, make sense to those who believe that respect to symbolic entities is more 
important than the right of individual decisions and actions.   
Although our results linked the presumption of harm to anger,  it is also possible that 
presumption of harm may sometimes work to justify reactions based on disgust. For example, 
some scholars such as Kass (1997) have argued that feelings of repugnance alert us to 
important considerations outside a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, and that while these 
feelings should be weighed against pragmatic concerns, they explain why society does and 
should recoil from practices such as human cloning. Presuming harm may also serve 
important social and motivational functions, intensifying sanctions against those who 
transgress taboo norms (Neuberg, Smith & Asher, 2000); or reacting aggressively against 
reminders of our animal nature (Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, McCoy, Greenberg, & Solomon, 
1999; Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Kluck, & Cornwell, 2001). This post-
hoc presumption can also be used to justify moral judgments based on ideology, political, or 
religious beliefs. For example, Haidt and Hersh (2001), reported that conservatives tend to 
employ all three moral codes proposed by the CAD triad hypothesis, while the moral domain 
of liberals was limited only to the ethics of autonomy. 
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Although these results highlight the effect of taboo violations on reactions of anger 
and harm, these experiments did not test the possibility that non-creatural actions associated 
with socio-moral disgust—such racism or cheating—could have similar effects, or whether 
non-creatural actions associated with divinity violations could have these effects as well. Our 
examples, and the divinity ethics violations of Rozin et al. (1999), all involved violation of 
some bodily norm about food (meat in particular), disease, or sexuality. A true test of whether 
disgust is essentially creatural versus divinity-related would involve violations of purity in 
aesthetic and religious rather than bodily realms. Future research should focus on 
investigating whether socio-moral disgust can arise reliably, since its implications for 
prejudice and racism are important. If some hostile reactions towards other groups are based 
on harm to symbolic entities, research on intergroup violence and discrimination can benefit 
from research on moral emotions, since the presumption of harm will be associated with 
anger, and anger with punitive action tendencies. 
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Appendix 1: Scenarios used in Experiment 1. 
 
"Incest": Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are travelling together in France 
on a summer vacation from college. One night they are saying alone in a cabin near the beach. 
They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At very least it 
would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills. But 
Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to 
do it again. 
(no consequences: Julie and Mark have no regrets about that night and keep it as a 
special secret between them, which makes then feel even closer to each other. Eventually, 
they move on and are able to form successful long-term committed relationships with other 
people. Nobody ever finds out about what they did on their holiday.) 
(harm to self: Julie and Mark develop deep regrets about that night and keep it as a 
dark secret, which complicates the relationship between them. Eventually, they are unable to 
form successful long-term committed relationships with other people. Nobody ever finds out 
about what they did on their holiday.) 
(harm to others: Julie and Mark have no regrets about that night and try to keep it as a 
special secret between them, which makes then feel even closer to each other. Eventually, 
they move on and are able to form successful long-term committed relationships with other 
people. However, their family eventually finds out and are very hurt by what Julie and Mark 
have done.) 
"Necrophilia": A man belongs to a necrophilia club that has devised a way to satisfy 
the desire to have sex with dead people. Each member donates his or her body to the club 
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after death so that the other members of the club can have sex with the corpse. The man has 
sex with a dead woman who gave her body to the club. (No consequences and harm self: She 
had no surviving family members). The man and all other members of the club use adequate 
protection so there is no risk of disease being spread. After they are done, they cremate the 
woman's body, following her final instructions to them. 
(no consequences: The man and his fellow club members have no regrets or mental 
anguish about what they are doing. They understand that it's important to keep their club a 
secret and they are very successful in making sure nobody in the "outside world" finds out 
about it. Also, they know the limits of the club, and they are never tempted to harm living 
people or engage in sex with corpses whose owners did not consent beforehand.) 
(harm self: The man and his fellow club members are tormented by regret and mental 
anguish about what they are doing. They understand that it's important to keep their club a 
secret and they are very successful in making sure nobody in the "outside world" finds out 
about it. Also, they know the limits of the club, and they are never tempted to harm living 
people or engage in sex with corpses whose owners did not consent beforehand.) 
(harm others: The man and his fellow club members have no regrets or mental anguish 
about what they are doing. They try to keep their club a secret, but the family of the dead 
woman eventually finds out and is deeply hurt. Also, some of the members of the club are 
tempted to break the rules and engage in sex with corpses whose owners did not consent 
beforehand.) 
"Scientist" : A scientist studying recent advances in cell cloning technology takes a 
group of muscle cells from her arm and clones them in a vat. The cells grow into a strip of 
human muscle tissue about the size of a steak. When the process is finished, she is curious 
about the meat's taste, so she takes the strip of tissue, grills it on a barbecue, (No 
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consequences and harm self: and eats it alone for dinner. Harm others: and give it to her 
friends without their knowledge). She knows she is free of any communicable diseases. 
(no consequences: The scientist does not develop a taste for human flesh, and she is 
never tempted to harm people. Her curiosity is satisfied and she goes on with her research. 
She has no regrets or worries about what she has done, as it was all in the name of science.) 
(harm self: The scientist does not develop a taste for human flesh, and she is never 
tempted to harm people. Her curiosity is satisfied and she goes on with her research. 
However, she develops deep regrets about what she has done, and worries about whether it 
was worth doing in the name of science.) 
(harm others: Their friends did not develop a taste for human flesh, and she is never 
tempted to harm people. Her curiosity is satisfied and she goes on with her research. She has 
no regrets or worries about what she has done, as it was all in the name of science. Her friends 
all enjoyed the dinner, but when they find out afterwards what it was, they become quite upset 
and the scientist has to apologise to them.) 
 
Appendix 2: Scenarios used in Experiment 2. 
 
Non-taboo-violating versions: A scientist studying recent advances in human memory 
is investigating a new drug that may increase the capabilities of human memory. When she 
finally completes the process, she is curious about the effects of the drug, so she mixes the 
drug with water and (no harm: drinks it with her dinner in order to test it on herself; harm to 
others: gives it to her friends at a dinner without their knowledge in order to test it on them). 
She has no reason to believe that the drug has negative effects on humans. 
The scientist does not test the drug again and she was careful with the use of the drug. 
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Her curiosity is satisfied and she goes on with her research. (no harm: She has no regrets or 
worries about what she has done, as it was all in the name of science.) 
 
Taboo-violating versions: A scientist studying recent advances in cell cloning 
technology takes a group of muscle cells from her arm and clones them in a vat. The cells 
grow into a strip of human muscle tissue about the size of a steak. When the process is 
finished, she is curious about the meat's taste, so she takes the strip of tissue, grills it, and (no 
harm: eats it alone for dinner; harm to others: serves it to her friends for dinner without their 
knowledge). She knows it is free of any communicable diseases. 
The scientist does not develop a taste for human flesh, and she is never tempted to 
harm people. Her curiosity is satisfied and she goes on with her research. (No harm: She has 
no regrets or worries about what she has done, as it was all in the name of science.) 





1 Because of this lower correlation, it was not necessary to include one emotion as a 
covariate in analyzing the other emotion. In fact, for Studies 2 and 3, analyses covarying out 









Means and Standard Deviations of Harm, Moral Judgment,  Emotions and Action 
Tendencies by Harm Condition, Experiment 1. 
 No harm Harm self Harm others 
Moral judgment 6.92 (2.19)a 7.51 (1.90)b 8.31 (1.32)c 
Harm to others 6.07 (1.64)a 5.99 (1.54)a 8.00 (1.55)b 
Harm to self 5.95 (2.33)a 7.24 (1.94)b 6.49 (2.11)c 
Anger 3.77 (2.08)a 3.62 (1.87)a 4.97 (2.06)b 
Disgust 5.32 (2.36)a 5.08 (2.22)a 5.92 (2.13)b 
Disgust minus Anger +1.54 (1.52)a +1.46 (1.40)a +0.95 (1.27)b 
Punishment 3.55 (2.40)a 3.19 (2.23)a 4.96 (2.66)b 
Avoidance 5.76 (2.95)ab 5.53 (2.70)a 6.38 (2.72)b 
Avoidance minus Punishment +2.20 (2.26)a +2.34 (2.34)a +1.42 (2.15)b 
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses; means with different subscripts are 
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different from each other by Tukey LSD, p < .05. 





Figure 1. Theoretical model predicting (A) independent contribution of harm to others 
and taboo violation to anger and disgust reactions, (B) when no harm to others is described, 
presumption of harm from mere taboo violation as a post-hoc response, and (C) graphical 
representation of predictions for anger and perceived harm, and for disgust. 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 2: Effects of harm, taboo and load manipulations on symbolic 
harm. 
 
Figure 3. Experiment 2: Effects of harm and taboo manipulations on anger and 
disgust. 
 
Figure 4. Experiment 3: Effects of taboo and load manipulation on perceived actual 
and symbolic harm. 
 
Figure 5. Experiment 3: Effects of taboo manipulation on anger and disgust. 
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Note: Numbers are F (1,178) for simple effect of taboo within harm on that DV. ns = 
p > .10; m = p < .10, * = p < .05.
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Note: Numbers are F (1,178) for simple effect of taboo within harm upon that DV. ns = p > 
.10, *** = p < .001, ** = p < .01. 














































Note: Numbers are F (1, 91) for simple effect of taboo. ns = p > .10; * = p < .05. 
 










































Note: Numbers are F (1, 91) for simple effect of taboo. m = p < .10, *** = p < .001. 
